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In June 2006, the Vatican forcefully asserted its copyright in all
papal texts, sending a bill for past royalties to one publishing house
and indicating that "prior agreement" with the Vatican would be
necessary for newspapers to publish excerpts from officially
released papal documents.1 If the Vatican were to assert its
copyright against a publisher or a newspaper in U.S. courts, how
would its claim be treated? Presumably the creation and
distribution of papal texts are motivated by considerations other
than monetary reward. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Pope and
the Vatican do not need the incentive created by copyright law in
order to create or distribute papal writings. Should this affect the
eligibility for or the scope of copyright protection? Papal texts are
not the only category of works where the incentive of the copyright
is not the primary motivating force for the creation and
dissemination of the work. If the driving motivation for the
creation of certain works is unrelated to copyright protection,
should that play a role in determining either the existence of
copyright protection, or the scope of rights that copyright law
grants to the creators of those works?
1. Richard Owen, Vatican 'Cashes In' by Putting Price on The Pope's
Copyright, THE TIMES (United Kingdom), Jan. 23, 2006.
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Current U.S. copyright law, while based on a utilitarian theory,
does not expressly consider motivation in determining protection
afforded to copyright owners. Indeed, when looking solely at U.S.
copyright law, it appears that the U.S. adheres completely to the
notion that "no man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for
money. '' 2 This Article argues that while the grant of copyright
protection without reference to motivational factors may be
appropriate, the law should take creator and distributor motivation
into account in determining how robust the copyright protection
afforded should be.
The approach argued for in this Article will result in less
robust, or "thin,"' 3 copyright protection for those types of works
that do not require the incentive of the copyright to be created and
distributed.4 As explained in Part I, this approach is entirely
consistent with the utilitarian underpinnings of U.S. copyright law.
If copyright law is designed to guard against underproduction of
intangible assets that, without the legal rights afforded by
copyright, would be a public good,5 then it should not be
problematic to provide less protection for those types of works that
appear to not risk underproduction absent legal protection.
Providing less protection to certain categories of works, however,
may do harm to an author's rights view of copyright law. This
harm could be counterbalanced by a stronger right of attribution
than is currently provided to authors of creative works under U.S.
copyright law.6
2. JAMES BOSWELL ET AL., BOSWELL's LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed.,
1934). Samuel Johnson's famous quote has been included in several important
copyright decisions in the United States. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994); Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998). I offer no comment on this quote
when considered in the context of papal writings.
3. Courts and commentators often refer to "thin" copyright protection for
those works that, while eligible for copyright protection, have less creativity or
originality. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir.
2003); TransWestern Publ'g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133
F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1998).
4. Lisa Ramsey has proposed such reduced protection for advertising
works. Lisa Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 246-47 (2006).
5. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 6-8 (2d ed. 2006).
6. As discussed more below, providing a stronger right of attribution may
be more in line with the desires of creators whose motivations for creating new
works are non-monetary. For a general discussion of the significant effects that
an author's name can have, see Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of Authornym:
Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377
20081
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It is time to take into account the social cost of uniform levels
of protection in copyright law. All works are not created equal;
different types of works are motivated by different considerations.
Fundamentally, many works that meet the extremely weak
requirement of some minimal degree of originality are not created
as a result of the monetary incentive offered by copyright
protection. In addition to papal and other religious texts, examples
of other types of works created and distributed without the primary
motivation being the marketable right provided by copyright law
include, but are by no means limited to: email and other personal
communications, model legal codes, standard portrait photography,
amateur/home photography, architectural works, advertising
artwork and advertising copy, 7 scholarly articles,8 and legal
documents. 9 In this Article, these types of works are referred to as
"differently motivated works."' While the protection afforded by
copyright law may be important for a variety of reasons to the
creators or distributors of differently motivated works, robust
copyright is not necessary. Thus, with respect to differently
motivated works, there is no reason why society should endure the
cost of uniformly robust copyright protection for these types of
works.
After surveying the normative reasons for candidly using
motivation for creation as a basis for distinguishing different levels
of protection in Part I, Part II examines the costs associated with
copyright protection. Part III argues that complete elimination of
copyright protection for differently motivated works would be
inappropriate. Part IV describes how the current Copyright Act
(2005), and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1945, 1949-70 (2006).
7. See Ramsey, supra note 4.
8. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, The Economics of Open Access Law
Publishing, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 779 (2006).
9. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but merely illustrative of the
types of works that should be granted a narrower scope of copyright protection.
There certainly are other types of works that may fit the criteria. The types of
works identified here will be used to illustrate the points asserted throughout this
article.
10. In settling on the phrase "differently motivated works," I rejected "non-
economically motivated works" as many of these types of works are directly
economically motivated. For example, portrait photographers are motivated by
the compensation they receive from their clients and subjects, and lawyers are
motivated by the payment of fees to create legal documents. Being motivated by
economics, however, is not the same as being motivated by the marketable right
granted by copyright law.
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does not expressly consider motivational realities in granting or
calibrating copyright protection.
The final sections of the Article explore the ways in which
copyright law could vary the level of protection afforded to
differently motivated works. While statutory changes could best
accomplish the much needed recalibration, industry capture of the
legislative process in the field of copyright law is well
documented," making legislative change unlikely. Thus, a more
realistic approach is for courts to interpret the current statute and
provide appropriately "thin" protection. As explored in Part V,
courts should incorporate a motivational inquiry in establishing the
level of similarity needed for non-literal infringement and should
engage in a more searching analysis of the second and fourth fair
use factors when a differently motivated work is at issue. Finally,
Part VI provides some preliminary ideas on statutory changes that
would accomplish appropriate tailoring of rights.
I. WHY MOTIVATION IS AN APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION IN
DETERMINING SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Should courts explicitly consider motivation in determining the
scope of copyright protection? The answer to this normative
question depends on what one believes to be the purpose of
copyright law. Generally, justifications for copyright protection
fall into three broad categories: utilitarian, natural rights, and
author's rights. The utilitarian justification is based on a belief that
without the protection afforded by copyright law, creative works
would be under-produced.12 The natural rights justification holds
that providing a legal means of protection for the oroducts of a
man's creativity is the morally right course of action. A Hegelian
based author's rights view of copyright posits that providing
protection for the creations of the mind helps individuals become
fully self-realized. 14 Continental European copyright laws stem
11. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) [hereinafter DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT]; Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Copyright, Compromise].
12. COHEN, supra note 5, at 6-8.
13. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533,
1544-45 (1993).
14. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957,
972 (1982). See also Gordon, supra note 13.
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from an author's rights conception recopgizing the bond between
creator and the intangible work created.'
In the United States, the justification for copyright protection is
overwhelmingly utilitarian. The law grants protection for
copyrighted works in order to achieve a goal--the advancement of
knowledge and learning. 17 It is believed that without the
marketable right of the copyright there would be insufficient
incentives for the creation and distribution of creative works.'
8
The intangible asset that the law identifies as the copyrighted
work can be thought of as a "public good" in the economic use of
that phrase. Characterized by non-rivalous consumption and non-
excludability, without legal protection it is feared that, like all
public goods, copyrighted works will be under-produced. 19 The
grant of exclusive rights to creators of copyrighted works is
designed to correct for potentially sub-optimal production by
providing a marketable right to those creators. This marketable
right creates an incentive for production. As a marketable right, the
magnitude of the incentive is, in theory, perfectly calibrated by the
invisible hand of the market. The more "in demand" a work or type
of work is, the greater the potential reward and thus the greater the
incentive will be to create and distribute those types of works. The
value of creators' and distributors' rewards is linked to the market
for the works themselves, with greater profits made possible by
copyright protection.
The utilitarian theory posits that without the legal protections
afforded by copyright, creative individuals and entities would not
have the same level of incentive to create and distribute new
works. Without legal protections, popular works would be copied
by competitors and the price driven down to the marginal cost of
15. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990); Gordon,
supra note 13, at 1533.
16. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 217-223; cf Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
17. This purpose behind copyright law is expressly stated in the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Exclusive rights granted to authors
are meant to "promote progress in science." Id. (emphasis added). At the time of
the framing of the Constitution, "science" connoted broadly "knowledge and
learning." Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability,
48 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11 n.13 (1966) (noting that the most
authoritative dictionary at the time listed "knowledge" as the first definition of
"science").
18. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1343 (1989).
19. COHEN, supra note 5, at 6-7.
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each copy. The original creator and distributor might not be able to
recoup expenses incurred in the creation of the work and, at a
minimum, would not be able to obtain as much profit in the face of
direct competition.20 Preventing copying through copyright law
allows for higher profits for copyright owners, thereby creating the
incentive to invest in the creation and dissemination of new works.
As the Supreme Court recently stated, "copyright law serves public
ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private
ones.
When considering the effects of the marketable right created by
copyright, it is important to remember that knowledge is advanced
not only by new works being created, but by those new works
being shared with others as well.22 Thus, when discussing the
incentives created by copyright, it is also important to consider the
incentives necessary to achieve dissemination.23 When start-up
costs for dissemination are costly or the risk of recouping
insufficient returns is high, copyright protection's elimination of
direct competition allows distributors to charge higher prices and
thereby recoup start-up investment faster and reduce the risk of
insufficient returns. However, the distributors of differently
motivated works often have other motivations for distribution
beyond pure profit. The cost of dissemination is real, although in a
digital world that cost may be significantly reduced for certain
types of distribution methods. 24 Because of this real cost, under-
dissemination may remain a concern even for works whose
creators are in no way motivated by the marketable right created
20. Cf Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281 (1970). Professor (now Justice) Breyer argues that there are other means for
publishers to recoup investment, including lead-time advantage and brand
loyalty.
21. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
22. Both initial disclosure to others and public distribution facilitate the
advancement of knowledge. First publication can be an important right for all
copyright owners and is protected through the reproduction right. See Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
23. The complicated dynamics between authors and publishers, or creators
and disseminators more broadly, remains part of the copyright world that cannot
be ignored. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, A Brief History of Author-Publisher
Relations and the Outlook for the 21st Century, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A.
425 (2003). While the use of internet distribution of certain types of creative
works can be accomplished without the need for distributors, distributors still
play an important role off the internet and on the internet as well.
24. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(2002).
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by copyright. Thus, some level of copyright protection may be
necessary, although fully robust copyright protection may not be.
Pausing at this juncture to consider some of the categories of
works identified at the outset of this Article may help to provide
some insight into the effect of providing copyright protection for
these types of works. It would seem that the Vatican has sufficient
incentive to both create and distribute papal texts without regard
for the rights afforded by copyright protection. The Vatican seeks
to provide guidance to those of the Catholic faith on a wide array
of matters. That guidance comes in the form of written
communications authored by the Pope and other church officials
and distributed through the Vatican to churches and believers
worldwide. Copyright protection for these works permits the
Vatican to recoup the cost of creating and producing copies of the
works, and to the extent copyright protection allows the Vatican
profits beyond the marginal cost of production of those copies,
helps offset the operational cost of the Vatican itself.25 Copyright
law, therefore, can be viewed as providing a subsidy to the
Catholic Church.26 However, even in the absence of copyright
protection, there appears to be little risk of under-production,
under-disclosure, or under-dissemination of these types of works.
The creation of email messages and personal communications
also appears to be sufficiently motivated by incentives unrelated to
those provided by copyright protection.27 The distribution of these
items, at least to one recipient, does not require the incentive of the
Copyright Act; they are created for the purpose of being shared in
this manner. It is also unlikely that affording copyright protection
to these works provides an incentive for the sender to further
distribute them. Again, the risk of under-production or insufficient
disclosure or dissemination appears minimal. The protection of
copyright for these correspondences may, instead, decrease their
subsequent distribution by the recipients by allowing the author of
the email to object to subsequent reproduction.28
25. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of copyright as a form of authors' welfare, see Tom W.
Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 229 (2003).
27. A particularly interesting example of this principle is demonstrated by
cease and desist letters sent by lawyers to alleged copyright infringers. Those
letters are created not because of the incentive that copyright protection
provides, but rather to protect the marketable right in a copyrighted work. Yet
the copyright office has registered and courts have acknowledged the copyright
in the cease and desist letter itself See, e.g., In re 43sb.com LLC, No. MS-07-
6236-EJL-MHW (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://pub.bna.com/eclr/
076236_111607.pdf.
28. See id.
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The production of model legal codes appears to be motivated
by concerns for legal reform or by the concerns of the members of
the organization proposing any particular model law.2 9 Model
codes offer a way to create industry standards with legal
enforceability. Model codes are often drafted by industry
organizations seeking to achieve the benefits associated with
favorable legal codes as well as the benefits that can accompany
standardized legal codes. The marketable right granted by
copyright law and the potential for supra-competitive pricing made
possible by copyright protection is not the primary motivation for
the creation of model codes. Model codes have been held to be
protected by copyright. Though the model code may retain
protection even after it is enacted the enacted version is no longer
subject to copyright protection.3° Copyright protection permits
these organizations to charge a price for copies of the model code
that is greater than the marginal cost of production and greater than
they would be able to charge in a market with direct competitors
selling the same work.3 1 To the extent that copyright law provides
protection for model codes, that protection permits these
organizations to earn profits that help offset the costs of creating
those codes. It is unlikely, however, that the potential for supra-
competitive pricing that copyright Brotection facilitates leads to
increased creation of model codes. The industry has sufficient
incentive to create and distribute these works without a robust
copyright right.
It is likely that portrait photography, like those available in
shopping malls across the country or hired by contract for events
such as weddings or high school graduation, would be created even
without the protection that the photographer 33 obtains under
29. For example, building-contractor associations are a main proponent of
model building codes and stand to benefit by the enactment of the codes they
create.
30. The protection for model codes becomes almost non-existent once that
code is enacted into law. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 293
F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
31. Id. at 794-95.
32. To the extent that some groups may enter the model code business in
order to profit from sales of the works, those may not be the groups society
would be most interested in having draft model legislation. While there are also
problems with industry groups writing the codes that govern the players in that
industry, affording model codes less robust copyright protection would likely
not significantly reduce industry group incentive to create such codes.
33. In many situations of portrait photography today, the photographer is
employed by a corporation and is taking the photographs within the scope of her
employment. In these situations, the author of the work would be the
corporation. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "work made for hire").
2008]
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copyright law. The photographers are paid to create these images
by clients who are not initially motivated by the marketable right
that copyright protection affords. The existence of copyright
protection may affect pricing schemes used by portrait
photographers, but it is unlikely that it motivates additional
creativity or distribution.34 Yet copyright protection for these types
of works can interfere with legitimate uses by the consumer.
35
Amateur and home photography also is not motivated by the
monetary incentive provided by copyright protection. People take
pictures to capture memories and to document both life's
milestones and trivialities. Copyright protection has nothing to do
with providing an incentive for the creation of these types of
photographs. In the age of the internet, mass public distribution of
these images also does not appear to be motivated by financial
gain. Photographic images on sites such as Flickr and Picasa
36abound, and while these distribution sites offer participants a
choice concerning the assertion of copyright ownership, it is
almost as if that choice is an afterthought, certainly not a
motivating factor in the creation of the vast majority of images.
The creation and distribution of works designed to advertise a
product or a service are also not primarily motivated by the
34. It is possible that the existence of copyright protection for these images
helps keep the initial price for the creation of these images lower. If a
photographer factors in the profits that are possible from the marketable
copyright rights in the photographs, she may initially charge less to the client,
figuring to make additional profits through the copyright.
Industry pricing practice may differ for other types of professional portrait
photography. As any parent of a teenager can convey, the industry practice
surrounding "senior pictures" varies widely. One recent example relayed to me
involved payment of over $150 for an initial set of approximately ten
photographic proofs. Additional prints from those proofs were also extremely
expensive when ordered through the photographer. No assignment of copyright
could be obtained. When asked what type of prints the parent was going to
order, the response was that the parent planned to scan the proofs and make their
own prints at home. This anecdote may, in fact, indicate that copyright
protection in the digital age is meaningless for the photographer, thus explaining
the high price for the initial proofs. If that is the case, then robust copyright
protection is unnecessary as these works will be created regardless of the level
of copyright protection.
35. Just try taking one studio-produced portrait photograph to a copy store
to include as one of over twenty home photographs in a personalized calendar as
a gift for the grandparents. Stores routinely refuse to reproduce such images. See
Fred Meyer Brochure, Copyright and Your Photographic Products (on file with
author). Additionally, privacy concerns and rights of publicity claims may
restrict the ability of the photographer, as creator of these works, from
authorizing further distribution.
36. See Flickr, http://www.flickr.com (last visited July 31, 2008); Picasa
(from Google), http://www.picasa.com (last visited July 31, 2008).
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marketable right granted by copyright law.37 The creation and
distribution of advertising is motivated by the desire to increase
awareness, and ultimately sales, of a product or service. The
creative individuals producing the advertisements are paid directly
by the companies employing them. The companies, in turn, recoup
their investment in the advertising through increased sales of the
product or services advertised.38 The copyright protection afforded
advertising works does not motivate their creation and
dissemination. If the scope of protection for these types of works
were reduced, it is highly unlikely that fewer of them would be
produced and distributed. 9
As these examples illustrate, if providing copyright protection
is meant to address the potential sub-optimal production and
distribution of creative works, calibrating protection based on the
primary motivation for creation and distribution seems reasonable.
It is appropriate to afford less protection to creators of works who
do not need the incentive copyright protection is designed to
provide because under-production is not a threat. Some minimal
level of protection may be necessary to offset the cost of
distribution, but the scope of copyright protection necessary is not
likely to be as great as with other categories of works. Using
primary motivation for creation and distribution to shape the scope
of copyright protection is justified through this straightforward
account of the utilitarian purpose of copyright.
There is an additional subset of differently motivated creative
works that is also worth considering. It is well known in
psychological literature, and more fundamentally on an intuitive
level, that some of the most highly creative works are created by
individuals who are not motivated by monetary gain.40 Many
artists, authors, musicians, poets, and other highly creative
individuals create as a means of expressing themselves, rather than
for an extrinsic reward. "Such intrinsic motivations can include the
desire for challenge, personal satisfaction, or the creation of works
with a particular meaning or significance for the author. '41 Works
37. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 217-23. Professor Ramsey also questions the
net social benefit of the government encouraging the creation and dissemination
of advertising. Id. at 229-36.
38. Id. at 218.
39. Id. at 219-23.
40. TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 115 (1996) (discussing
the Intrinsic Motivation Principle as a fundamental principle in our
understanding of human creativity). See also Kwall, supra note 6, at 1949-70
(exploring the theological and secular perspectives on inspirational motivations).
41. Kwall, supra note 6, at 1947.
2008]
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in which the intrinsic dimension of creativity42 is high also do not,
under the utilitarian story of copyright, need the marketable right
granted by copyright to induce their creation. For these works, less
robust protection for the economic right granted by copyright
protection should be coupled with some protection for the non-
economic rights that U.S. copyri0ht law does not currently protect:
rights of attribution and integrity.
A market-based approach to copyright law assumes that all
individuals are motivated by monetary reward. 44 The effect of this
underlying assumption on the scope of copyright protection
afforded should be reexamined. This plea for reexamination comes
at a time when those in the field of economics are calling for more
consideration of the rational actor assumptions45 and at a time
when social science research and literature is gaining greater
prominence as an influencing force in the design of incentives
created by legal rules.46 Given the costs of copyright protection, as
described in the next section, the scope of copyright protection
afforded different types of works should factor in the full range of
motivations for creation and distribution of original works of
authorship.
II. THE COSTS OF ROBUST COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Investigating the costs of copyright protection strengthens the
conclusion that motivation should be considered explicitly when
determining the strength of copyright protection granted to
different types of works. Providing legal rights for creators of
works of authorship involves a cost to society. The costs created by
copyright protection include the increased cost of "inputs" to the
creative process as well as the opportunity cost of the investment
in the creation of new works. Additionally, the wealth distribution
effect of copyright protection shifts resources from consumers and
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1991-2012. Professor Kwall endorses the need for greater
protection of these non-economic rights, but does not argue that a reduction in
the scope of protection for the economic rights is warranted. This article makes
the case for a reduction in scope of economic rights, although not a complete
elimination of those economic rights.
44. See BOSWELL, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Encouraging More Reality In Economics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007.
46. Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 1151 (2007).
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users of copyrighted works to copyright owners and should not be
ignored in evaluating the success of a copyright system.47
Scholars have begun to explore the cost of uniform protection
for intangible assets that derive from different technologies and
different creators, and that operate in different markets. s More
tailored rights that take into account these differences could reduce
the cost to society without sacrificing the underlying goal of
copyright protection: promoting the advancement of knowledge
and learning. C49pyright law does not contain such tailoring for
several reasons; however, the resulting uniformity of protection
translates into unnecessary costs to society.
The tailoring argued for in this Article would reduce the costs
of copyright protection when enduring those costs is unnecessary
because the creation and distribution of those works is differently
motivated. Thus, the goal would be to achieve the maximum level
of creative output at the lowest cost. The following sections
explore aspects of the costs of providing copyright protection.
A. Raising the Cost of Inputs to Creativity
When a piece of creative authorship is given copyright
protection, reuse of the expression embodied in that work by a
follow-on creator risks infringement liability.50 To assure oneself
of avoiding infringement liability, authorization from the copyright
owner is the safest route. Such authorization can come at varying
costs. All authorizations incur the transaction costs associated with
locating and negotiating authorization, and many authorizations are
47. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology,
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV.
813, 900-02 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity
Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006). Professor
Carroll argues that "perfectly tailored rights that promise innovators only the
expected value required to induce socially desirable innovation would be
theoretically optimal if intellectual property rights were the only policy tool
available to promote innovation." Id. at 848 (footnote omitted). See also Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 691, 695-706 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the
Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1 (2004).
49. Professor Carroll identifies some reasons as "uncertainty about
innovation, information asymmetries between policymakers and innovators,
administrative costs of tailoring, and the political economy of intellectual
property policymaking." Carroll, supra note 48, at 848.
50. Infringement liability is not certain as the test for infringement requires
substantial similarity, or sufficient verbatim copying. Additionally, in certain
contexts fair use shields the reuse of expressive content from liability.
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not granted for free. The license fee charged for the use of the
expression in a follow-on work can vary widely. The combination
of the transaction costs and the price charged when a license can be
negotiated can have several negative consequences: fewer new
works are created, new works will cost consumers more, and the
new works that are created are different and sometimes not as
culturally rich or as authentic as they could have been if the costs
of reuse were lower.
Evidence of the works not created because of these costs is
difficult to obtain, as it is evidence of a negative. However, the
nightmare anecdotes abound. For example, when a documentary
film maker sought to use footage of stage hands of the opera Ring
Cycle in San Francisco watching the television cartoon "The
Simpsons" backstage for 4.5 seconds, the price quoted for the use
of those 4.5 seconds was $10,000. This price was prohibitive for
the documentary budget and instead the actual footage was
digitally altered to replace the footage. 51 This example
demonstrates the real costs and consequences associated with
robust copyright protection. In any tailoring regime, reduced
control over reuse of expressive content in subsequent works
should be a central goal.
B. Wealth Transfers and Distributive Effects
A fundamental result of granting copyright protection is that
consumers pay more for creative works. As explained above, the
exclusive rights facilitate copyright owners receiving a price for
their work that is above the price that would otherwise result in a
competitive market. This can be viewed as a cost the public pays
as a result of copyright protection, but in reality it is merely a
wealth transfer from consumers to distributors and creators of
copyrighted works.
53
A further cost that the existence of the exclusive rights granted
by copyright law imposes, as explored in the previous section, is
borne by the creators of new works and ultimately by consumers of
those new works. If one of the inputs to a new work is a
protectable element of a pre-existing copyrighted work,
authorization to use those elements is necessary in order to make
51. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 95-99 (2004).
52. Other examples are recounted in KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT Bozos AND OTHER ENEMIES OF
CREATIVITY (2005).
53. See Bell, supra note 26, at 229.
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the use lawful.54 The need to obtain permission from the copyright
owner of the pre-existing work creates costs and hold-up problems,
which raise the cost of creation for the new work, ultimately
raising the cost for consumers of new works. Again, however, this
can be viewed as a mere wealth transfer from consumer to
copyright owner. In the end, Congress has made the choice that the
transfer of wealth afforded by the copyright law promotes the end
goal of the regime: promoting knowledge and learning. In the
United States, we approve of this wealth transfer as a means to
"get what we want"--the creation and distribution of creative
works. 5
5
Some brush aside wealth transfers, confident that absent
market failures, the market will sort things out and marketable
items, including the rights embodied in copyright protection, will
be transferred to the entity that places the most value on that item.
Wealth distribution effects, however, may have a significant effect
56
on achieving the underlying goal of copyright.
[A] regime that couples creativity and money also affects
the distribution of creative opportunities. Some creators
want the monetary incentive that copyright provides; others
do not. Some creators can bear the expenses that copyright
imposes; others cannot . . . . Should we understand the
copyright regime as a subsidy that makes their creativity
possible? Or as a tax that makes it unaffordable? How
should we think about these possibilities in light of
enduring values about the distribution of expressive
opportunities?
57
Others have noted the skewed effect that increased copyright
protection has had, benefiting the highly organized content owning
industries while adversely affecting amateur and non-commercial
54. The required authorization may be obtained from the copyright owner
or may be found in the Copyright Act itself in sections such as those providing
fair use rights, 17 U.S.C. § 107, mechanical copying rights, § 115, or other
statutory limitations, §§ 107-123.
55. Lunney, supra note 47, at 900-03 (questioning the wisdom of pointing
to the growth in the copyright industries in recent years as evidence of increased
creative output, suggesting instead that growth may be the result of the bold
extension of additional rights to copyright owners, which has allowed copyright
owners to capture more consumer surplus without adding new works into the
marketplace).
56. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83
TEX. L. REv. 1535 (2005).
57. Id. at 1537-38.
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producers of expressive content.58 In light of the goals of copyright
law, we should be disturbed by unequal distribution of expressive
opportunities and the detrimental effects of greater enclosure of the
inputs to creativity. Distributing opportunities to create expressive
works, even those that embody elements of pre-existing works
contributes to the expansion of knowledge and learning for all.
5 9
While the costs associated with these distribution effects are
present for all copyrighted works, good policy should seek to
minimize this cost when the works involved do not require robust
copyright protection to insure their creation and distribution.
As technology has advanced, the economics of creativity and
distribution have changed significantly. Far more people have the
technical capability to create new works by remixing components
from the culture around them.60 As a result, the societal costs of
copyright protection, relative to the gains, are now far greater.6 1 If
the goal of copyright law is to promote knowledge and learning for
all citizens,62 the wealth distribution effects caused by copyright
protection may create an impediment to achieving that goal. In
cases where this wealth redistribution is unnecessary, such as for
differently motivated works, the scope of copyright protection
should be reduced.
C. Opportunity Costs
Still another cost of copyright protection, unassociated with
wealth transfers, should be considered: opportunity costs. The
marketable right provided by copyright protection is designed to
create an incentive to invest in the creation and distribution of new
works. However, when one invests in that activity, he is forgoing
investments in other activities. The other non-creative activities
forgone might produce greater social welfare. This is the
opportunity cost created by copyright protection. These
opportunity costs should not be ignored in evaluating the success
58. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354-408
(1999); Kwall, supra note 6, at 1996; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1, 65 (2001).
59. Van Houweling, supra note 56, at 1548.
60. Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing
with Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 69, 70 (2000).
61. Id. at 70-72.
62. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REv.
1799 (2000).
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of any copyright regime63 or in evaluating the appropriate scope of
protection to afford to different types of works.
The types of works on which this Article is focused would be
created even in the absence of copyright protection, as they are not
primarily motivated by the monetary reward system made possible
by copyright protection.64 Thus, opportunity cost is not a
significant cost for these types of works.
D. Costs of Perceived Unfairness in Copyright Law
There is a not-so-subtle cost to the current copyright regime
that results from its mismatch with social norms. Individuals not
well versed in copyright law find it odd, perhaps even startling,
that certain activities in their daily lives may violate copyright law.
As Professor John Tehranian has observed:
[T]hree key trends bear close observation. First, copyright
law is increasingly relevant to the daily life of the average
American. Second, this growing pertinence has precipitated
a heightened public consciousness over copyright issues.
Finally, these two facts have magnified the vast disparity
between copyright law and copyright norms and, as a
result, have highlighted the need for reform.
65
Professor Tehranian asserts that "even the most law-abiding
American engages in thousands of actions that likely constitute
copyright infringement.
'
"
66
When the mismatch between social norms and the law are
significant, citizens lose trust in that law.67 This may explain, in
63. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483, 487-88, 589-99 (1996). Of course, it may be
the case that if a creator is not motivated by monetary concerns in the initial
creation of a work, he may, nonetheless, become motivated once the market
feedback mechanism kicks in. If the market is "telling" the author to create more
of that type of work, then the proxy of the market, at least, is indicating that the
socially optimal quantity of that type of work has not yet been reached.
Alternatively, a creator not motivated by monetary concerns may remain
unmotivated by any feedback from the market, in which case even the existence
of copyright protection is irrelevant as an influencing factor.
64. In several of the examples, there are other monetary rewards, just not
ones created by copyright law. Legal pleadings, for example, are created by
lawyers who are reaping monetary rewards for their work. Those monetary
rewards, however, are not created as a result of copyright protection.
65. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 537, 539 (2007). Photographs of toys
constitute derivative works of those toys. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc.,
531 F. Supp. 2d 990 (N.D. I11. 2008).
66. Tehranian, supra note 65, at 543.
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part, the widespread disregard for copyright protection through
user posted material on sites such as youtube.com and through
peer-to-peer file sharing, even in spite of strong rulings from the
courts that this activity constitutes infringement. The widespread
disregard of the law is a real cost that should be taken into account
when considering the design of a legal regime.
A variety of elements are leading users of copyrighted works to
distrust the law and ultimately to disregard it. Copyright protection
requires only two elements: (1) fixation and (2) originality.68 The
first element is notoriously easy to satisfy--merely writing
something down or typing a document in a computer results in an
eligible fixation. The second element, originality, requires only a
modicum of creativity-again, a standard that is very simple to
satisfy.69 No registration is required, and no notice of copyright is
needed.7 0 And, that protection lasts for an extremely long time.7'
Furthermore, once a work obtains protection using even fragments
of that work can constitute infringement. All of this feeds a
public perception of a law out of step with reality.
73
III. WHY TAILORING SCOPE RATHER THAN COMPLETE ELIMINATION
OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR DIFFERENTLY MOTIVATED
CREATIONS IS APPROPRIATE
A. Reasons to Not Eliminate Protection Completely
The costs identified in the previous section could be a basis to
argue for the complete elimination of any copyright protection for
differently motivated works. However, several reasons counsel
against eliminating copyright protection for these works.
67. Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 225 (1997).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
69. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
70. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
71. For new works created today copyright protection lasts for the life of the
author plus 70 years. For works made for hire, pseudonymous and anonymous
works, copyright lasts for 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever expires first.
72. Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FoRDHM L. REv. 575 (2005).
73. See Tehranian, supra note 65.
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1. Distribution Costs May Necessitate Some Protection
While copyright protection may not be needed to motivate the
creation of differently motivated types of works, some minimal
level of protection may be necessary to create incentives for
distribution. The role of the publisher or distributor is undergoing
significant change in the digital era, but distribution still entails
costs, even if those costs are reduced in an interconnected world.
Providing copyright protection for works whose creation is not
motivated primarily by the monetary incentive created by
copyright can serve an important purpose of encouraging
distribution of that work. The strongest means of assuring
distribution of creative works is to require distribution as a
condition of obtaining copyright protection. While in the first
copyright acts of this country publication was required to obtain
federal copyright protection, the 1976 Copyright Act eliminated
publication as the defining act for federal protection.74 Even
though distribution is not required for protection, the existence of
copyright protection facilitates distribution by providing
assurances that once the work is released to the public the
copyright owner will be able to control some unauthorized uses of
the work.75
2. Cost of Error Counsels in Favor of Some Protection
A second reason to reject complete elimination of copyright
protection for differently motivated works involves consideration
of the cost of errors.76 Errors may be made at two different points
in the proposed analysis. There could be an erroneous
74. § 102 (defining works eligible for protection as those that are "fixed in
any tangible medium of expression"). The 1909 Copyright Act eliminated
publication as a requirement for protection for certain works, allowing those
unpublished works to obtain protection through registration.
75. The digital world has largely altered the landscape and, therefore, the
calculations that copyright owners must make concerning the ease of replication
once a work has been first published. The duplication and distribution made
possible by the internet counter-balances the protections afforded to copyright
owners when considering how little unauthorized reproduction can be
controlled. In the end, however, all that may be necessary is "some assurance
that copying will be limited." Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 222 (1996).
76. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L.
REv. 789, 845 (2002); Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and
Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 53 (1998) (arguing that some protection is necessary
for computer software, but not "thick" protection).
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classification of a category of works as differently motivated when
the creation of works in that category are, in fact, motivated by the
incentive of copyright. Errors also could be made in determining
whether a particular work belongs in a category of works that is
differently motivated. The cost of these errors would be an
underproduction of works in that category. That cost would be
higher if the result were complete elimination of copyright
protection. The incentive that is, in fact, needed would be
completely absent. By opting instead to provide some protection,
the potential cost of erroneous decisions on either of these
questions is significantly reduced.
3. Fairness Necessitates Some Protection
If copyright protection were eliminated for differently
motivated works, creators of different works would be treated
significantly differently, raising issues of fairness in the
distribution of entitlements under the Copyright Act.77 While the
primary basis for copyright protection in the United States is
utilitarian, there are distinct strains of natural rights justification.78
The unfairness of eliminating protection completely would make
calls for such reform sufficiently unpalatable so as to be
unobtainable.
However, many creators of differently motivated works are
concerned with a different aspect of protection: being identified as
the author of the work when that work reappears and having
control over whether they are identified as the creator of that work
when it appears in modified form or in a different context. The
behavior of millions of creators of certain types of works is
illustrative. The proliferation of web sites such as Flickr and
YouTube where home photographers post photographs and home
videos by the millions, often with dedications to the public domain
or under creative commons licenses, demonstrates that these
creators are largely unconcerned with the monetary rewards
facilitated by copyright. It seems these works have been created
and are being efficiently distributed without influence by
copyright. These creators, however, often want credit as the creator
of their works.7 9 Taking fairness into account for these differently
77. See Bell, supra note 26, at 272-75 (comparing the distribution of
entitlements provided by the Copyright Act to those provided by welfare
benefits).
78. See Yen, supra note 16.
79. The early experiences with creative commons licenses were that 97% to
98% of creators selected the licenses that required authorial attribution. See
Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works:
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motivated works may translate into 'anting a strong right of
attribution for these copyright owners, 0 while providing only a
minimal set of marketable rights.
The proposal offered by this Article would result in different
copyright owners being treated differently. Under an author's
rights justification for copyright law, motivation should play no
role in determining the scope of the protection. The only relevant
determination is whether the creator is an author and, therefore, is
deserving of certain rights in the works she creates. Yet, the
requirements for protection in the United States lead to some
creators being denied protection for their works. For example,
clothing designers8 ' and creators of works that may require
painstaking attention to detail, but which do not involve authorial
or creative judgment,82 are nonetheless not granted copyrights in
their creations. Because not all creations are protected by
copyright, unfairness already exists in the law. Choices have been
made concerning what to protect based on the underlying goals of
the statute. Providing less protection for differently motivated
works would be a similar choice, although some copyright
protection would be provided. Providing certain creators, instead,
with enhanced moral rights protection would also reduce the costs
associated with robust economic rights.
For infringement of the types of works not motivated by
copyright in the first place, an infringement action is often not
about monetary rewards or marketable rights. Sometimes creators
attempt to use copyright to prevent circulation of damaging
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of
Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 271, 288 n.98 (2007). See also Kwall, supra
note 6, at 1991-2011 (arguing in favor of an attribution right for works that are
intrinsically motivated). Professor Kwall argues that "moral rights protections
that are narrowly crafted to promote public education regarding the authorship
and original artistic meaning of the work represent appropriate measures to
achieve the very objectives of the Copyright Clause." Id. at 1986.
80. See Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006).
81. Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a
Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
305, 309 (2007); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687,
1702-04 (2006).
82. Heam v. Meyer, 664 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting copyright
protection for reproduction of public domain art prints completed using an
exacting and time-consuming process). See also Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v.
Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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information, 83 to prevent unflattering biographies, 84 or to protect
privacy interests. Alternatively, the copyright owners may assert
that the real reason they require control is to prevent consumers
from being confused by "unofficial" versions of the work.85 In
these instances, allowing robust copyright protection for these
types of works would mean protecting values that the Copyright
Act is not meant to promote. Indeed, for the most part, courts re ect
attempts to use copyriht to censor unflattering biographies 80 or
damaging information. And concerns about confusing the public
as to the "official" versions of a text are far better addressed by
trademark law.88 While the opinions rejecting copyright claims that
fundamentally are attempting to protect a different interest do not
seem to weigh creators' motivation in their infringement analysis,
motivational considerations may be influencing the courts. Instead
of allowing it to continue to discretely influence infringement
determinations, explicit consideration of motivation should be
encouraged.
4. Treaty Obligations
Complete elimination of protection for differently motivated
works would likely violate international treaty obligations. The
major international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention,
requires member countries to grant copyright protection to "literary
and artistic works., 89 Those works are defined as "every
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever
may be the mode or form of its expression ... ."90 The Berne
83. See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
84. See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991)
(permitting use of unpublished letters in an unflattering biography); New Era
Publ'ns Int'l., ApS v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990)
(permitting use of unpublished journal entries and letters in scholarly
biography).
85. This concern was identified by the Vatican in its pronouncement on its
copyright policy. See Owen, supra note 1.
86. See, e.g., Wright, 953 F.2d at 731 (permitting use of unpublished letters
in an unflattering biography); New Era, 904 F.2d at 152 (permitting use of
unpublished journal entries and letters in scholarly biography).
87. See Online Policy Group, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
88. See Heymann, supra note 6.
89. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.
2, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 36 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
90. The definition goes on to provide examples:
books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and
other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works;
choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; musical
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Convention contains no express statement of a requirement of
originality or creativity, although it does use the phrase
"intellectual creations." 91 This phrase appears in the context of
defining collections of works that member states are obliged to
protect, although some have asserted that, "[i]t is commonly
understood . . . that all works under the Berne Convention must
possess some 'intellectual creation ' which is often used
interchangeably with 'originality.'- 91 The TRIPs Agreement
incorporates the Berne Convention requirements wholesale.
93
While these conventions require protection, the minimum level
of protection required is not nearly as robust as the rights granted
under the current Copyright Act in the United States. For example,
Berne requires only that authors of works be granted "the excusive
right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements, and other
alterations of their work.",94 The Copyright Act, however, grants to
copyright owners the right to prepare "derivative works" based
upon the copyrighted work 95 which the Act defines as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as
a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
"derivative work."
compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which
are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to
cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture,
engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated
works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of
applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional
works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science,
Id.
91. Id. at art. 2(3). See also Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A
Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 949 (2002).
92. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 130 (2006).
93. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pt.
I, art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
94. Berne Convention, supra note 89, at art. 12.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
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Courts have encompassed within derivative works items such
as photographs of copyrighted toys96 and _plates depicting a single
image from a full-length motion picture.9 The Berne Convention
standard does not appear to require control over these types of uses
of copyrighted material. Thus, adjusting the level of protection
would be permissible under international treaties while complete
elimination would likely violate current treaty obligations.
5. First Amendment and Non-Discrimination Principles
Elimination of copyright protection for certain types of works
would likely encounter objections based on the First Amendment.
While the Supreme Court has held copyright law, generally, is
consistent with the First Amendment, 9 it has also rejected the
notion that any congressional action in the area of copyright is
categorically immune from First Amendment scrutiny.99 The Court
has held that further First Amendment scrutiny may be necessary
when congressional action "alters the traditional contours of
copyright .... 991oo Elimination of protection for original works of
authorship that are not primarily motivated by the marketable right
of the copyright would likely be viewed as an alteration of a
traditional contour of copyright and thus subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. 101
Even when subjected to First Amendment scrutiny, eliminating
protection for a category of work previously protected could
arguably be constitutional. The Copyright Act confers a benefit on
certain categories of speech rather than imposing consequences
based on speech activities. Under First Amendment analysis,
conferring a benefit is treated differently than government
regulation restricting speech. As the courts have recognized in the
trademark area, refusal to protect an individual's speech under
96. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 990, 994-95
(N.D. Ill. 2008).
97. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983).
98. As the Court observed in Harper & Row: "[T]he Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive
to create and disseminate ideas." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
99. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
100. Id.
101. In Eldred the Court did not provide any guidance on what are the
traditional contours of copyright law or how to determine those traditional
contours. The Tenth Circuit has attempted to provide some guidance on
interpreting the traditional contours of copyright law. See Golan v. Gonzales,
501 F.3d 1179, 1188-92 (10th Cir. 2007).
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federal law does not prevent the individual from engaing in that
speech and is not a violation of the First Amendment.' Similarly,
refusing to grant a copyright to creators of certain types of works
in no way restricts their ability to engage in that speech. While it is
likely that elimination of protection could pass constitutional muster,
the potential First Amendment challenge nonetheless provides an
additional reason to resist drastically altering copyright law.
B. Potential Concerns Raised by Tailoring
Increased tailoring of copyright rights also leads to negative
effects that must be considered. Tailoring leads to increased
complexity which has associated costs. Tailoring also requires line
drawing that, when done in the context of expressive works, can
raise First Amendment concerns. Also, line drawing in the context
of copyright law specifically encounters the principles embodied in
the aesthetic non-discrimination doctrine. Finally, the task of line-
drawing itself involves costs.
Currently the Copyright Act exudes complexity,'0 3 and thus we
should hesitate before increasing the problems that can arise from
complex laws. The more varieties that exist in the levels of
protection afforded, the more potential there is for error on the part
of a court adjudicating claims and on the part of individuals
seeking ex ante to conform their behavior to the law.
Counterintuitive complexity in the law presents more significant
challenges for individuals. When complexity facilitates a law that
comports with common sense, the complexity actually increases a
sense of fairness in the law and, ultimately, a higher level of
compliance with the law. Reducing the scope of protection for
works that do not need a robust level of protection may be more in
line with a sense of fairness in the copyright system.
As discussed above, the courts view copyright law as
consistent with the First Amendment. 1°4 While the Supreme Court
has held that heightened First Amendment scrutiny is appropriate
when a change in the law alters the traditional contours of
copyright, 0 5 adjusting the scope of protection would not constitute
102. See, e.g., In re Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to the refusal to register a mark
as scandalous and immoral). See also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1099
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
103. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification,
Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the
Importance of the Willfilness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 885 (1999).
104. See supra Part III.A.5.
105. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
2008]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
a fundamental change in the law. Copyright law has long
recognized varying levels of protection, albeit typically on a
continuum of works based on the quantum of creativity they
possess.106 Varying the level of protection based on the primary
motivations for particular types of work would be similar to
aspects of copyright law already part of the recognized doctrine.
For over a century, copyright law has embodied an aesthetic
non-discrimination doctrine. First articulated by Judge Holmes in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 10 7 courts are not to
judge the artistic merit of a work in determining whether a work is
eligible for copyright protection. As Holmes warned, "[i]t would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."'
10 8
But even Holmes recognized that the nature of the work at issue in
Bleistein, a pictorial illustration created to be used in an advertising
poster for a circus, "may be a circumstance for the jury to consider
in determining the extent of [the copyright owner's] rights .... 109
The approach urged here is to embrace this recognition that the
nature of the work and, in particular, the motivating forces for the
creation and distribution of those types of works should expressly be
considered in determining the extent of the copyright owner's rights.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that there are no First
Amendment or aesthetic non-discrimination problems associated
with reducing, but not eliminating, protections for differently
motivated works, there remains the cost of engaging in such
categorizations. The difficulties associated with identifying the
types of works that should be targeted for reduced levels of
protection are real.
If undertaken by Congress, the costs would include the time
and effort involved in determining appropriate categories and then
the time and effort expended in defending those determinations
from lobbies motivated to preserve the economic rents certain
industries have secured under the current structure of copyright. It
is difficult to find an example in the current Copyright Act
106. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991). Courts have also recognized varying levels of protection on the basis of
the level of utility that shapes the expression in the plaintiffs work. Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting the "thinness" of the protection for software and requiring the
defendant's work be "virtually identical" to the plaintiff's work in order to find
infringement).
107. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
108. Id. at 251.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
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evidencing a decision by Congress to reduce protections already
afforded.' r0 The examples of reduced protections currently
contained in the Copyright Act were enacted in the context of
granting protections where none existed before11' or were part of
an overhaul of the entire statute where the tradeoffs made for the
complete package of reforms involved overall increased levels of
protections. 112 Congressional reduction of protections is not only
costly but the likelihood of such reforms is also quite slim. If the
line drawing is undertaken by the courts, the cost is still real.
Courts, however, are accustomed to engaging in line drawing.
In the end, the costs incurred in providing a more tailored
approach are outweighed by the reduction in cost created by
unnecessarily robust copyright protection for differently motivated
works.
IV. THE IRRELEVANCY OF MOTIVATION UNDER CURRENT
COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE
A. Eligibility for Protection
Under U.S. copyright law, the motivation for the creation of a
particular work, or even a category of work, is not relevant to a
determination of whether a particular work is eligible for copyright
protection. All that matters under U.S. copyright law is whether the
work is fixed and whether it is original.1  Thus, works created by
accident," 4 without thought, or with no consideration of the
material rewards that might result, 115 obtain copyright protection
so long as they are fixed and original. Clearly papal texts are
110. DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 11 (describing copyright lawmaking as
a "one-way rachet up").
111. Sound recording amendments are an excellent example of this dynamic.
When sound recordings were granted copyright protection in 1971, specific
provisions were included to reduce the level of protection. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114
(2000). In 1996, when sound recordings were afforded some performance rights, the
rights granted were not as robust as those of other copyright owners. § 106(6).
112. See, e.g., § 110 (limitations on the rights of copyright owners in certain
types of works enacted as part of the 1976 Copyright Act).
113. § 102.
114. "A copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused
by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations." Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).
115. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(acknowledging copyright protection for the Zapruder film, a home movie of the
presidential motorcade during which JFK was shot).
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eligible for copyri't protection,' 16 as are email and other personal
communications, I model legal codes," 18 advertising works, and
amateur photography.
The determination at the outset to not inquire into motivation
for creation leads to a range of items being copyrighted that many
might find counter-intuitive. For example, the vast majority of
personal correspondence is sufficiently fixed and original to garner
copyright protection. In the United States, and indeed in almost all
countries, copyright protection is afforded to works even without
registration for protection and without notice of the author's claim
to copyright protection.' 19 Thus, a simple email to one's friend is
copyrighted upon creation regardless of the message's lack of a
copyright notice (the simple "c" within a circle) and regardless of a
failure to register the message for protection with the copyright
office.
120
The choice to not filter works based on motivation at this stage
is likely to be an efficient one. U.S. copyright law does not make a
distinction based on categories of works, let alone creative
motivation within those categories. Instead, in the United States,
the law awards copyright protection to all fixed, original works.'
2
'
B. Scope of Rights Protected by Copyright Law
All copyrighted works are given the same basic rights under
copyright law, specified in section 106 of the Copyright Act,
116. One might be tempted to consider that papal texts are actually the work
of God and therefore not protected. However, the Vatican does not assert that
the words of the Pope are the words of God, thus the Pope is the "author" of the
works he creates. See, e.g., Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
1997) (concluding that the work that the parties agreed was received from
celestial beings was a composite work and subject to a valid copyright).
117. See Litman, supra note 8.
118. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
119. Indeed, international treaty obligations require that no formalities be
imposed in order to obtain copyright protection. See Berne Convention, supra
note 89, at art. 5.
120. Registration is not required, although certain benefits do flow from
registration, such as serving as prima facie evidence that the work is original and
owned by the registrant. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2000).
121. "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . ." § 102.
The U.S. Constitution permits Congress to award copyright protection to all
"writings" of an "author." U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. While the 1909
Copyright Act used those words to identify the works eligible for protection, the
1976 Act utilizes words that do not risk a constitutional collision when a court
determines that a work does not qualify for protection. Id.
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including the fundamental rights to reproduce the work in copies,
to distribute copies of the work, and to make derivative works
based on the copyrighted work.12 2  Certain categories of
copyrighted works are also granted the right to publicly perform
the work. The same is true for the right to publicly display the
copyrighted work: only certain categories of works are granted a
public display right.123 For all of the rights granted, however, the
motivation for the creation of the work does not play a role in
determining what rights a copyright owner obtains. While all
copyright owners are granted the same set of basic rights, two
fundamental aspects of copyright law have significantly shaped the
scope of the protections afforded: the substantial similarity inquiry
and the statutory limitations on the rights of copyright owners,
including the critically important fair use defense. 4
1. Substantial Similarity
First, except in the case of an exact reproduction, the scope of
the right to control reproductions and the right to control the
creation of derivative works is determined by what constitutes a
"substantially similar" copy in an infringement analysis.' 25 This
type of case is often referred to as a case of "non-literal
infringement." Substantial similarity enters the analysis when the
allegation is one of a violation of the right provided in section
106(1), the right to control reproductions in copies, and also when
the allegation is one of a violation of the right provided in section
106(2), the right to prepare derivative works based on the work. If
a defendant is accused of non-literal infringement or of creating a
derivative work, a court will need to inquire whether the
defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's work.
12 6
122. § 106.
123. See § 106(4)-(5). Sound recording copyright owners are granted a more
limited public performance right: the right "to publicly perform the copyright
work by means of a digital audio transmission." § 106(6).
124. § 107.
125. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004); Tufenkian
Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003).
126. The degree of similarity is relevant at two points in the infringement
inquiry. First, because independent creation is an absolute defense to
infringement, to infringe a defendant must be found to have copied from the
plaintiff's work. Unless the defendant admits copying, copying is typically
demonstrated through circumstantial evidence of copying, by showing
defendant's access to the plaintiff's work and the similarity between the two
works. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1984). Additionally,
courts also then use the degree of similarity in determining whether the
defendant has improperly appropriated the protectable elements of the plaintiff's
2008]
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Without the required degree of similarity, a court will conclude
that there is no infringement.
Courts routinely require greater similarity for different types of
works. For example, when a work is considered to be more factual
in nature, courts require greater similarity in order to hold the
defendant liable for infringement. 127 Computer software, due to its
functional nature, also requires a greater degree of similarity for a
court to find non-literal infringement. 128 On the other hand, when
the work is considered more creative, less similarity is needed for a
court to find the similarity sufficiently "substantial" and thus
infringing. 129 These varying degrees of similarity are sometimes
referred to as "thin" and "thick" copyright protection.3 0 Courts
generally do not base the "thickness" of copyright protection on
the motivation of the creator of the work at issue or on the class of
works to which that work belongs. 131 As explored in more detail in
Part IV, in the case of papal decrees and other types of differently
motivated works, the motivation for the creation should be relevant
to a determination of the degree of similarity required in order to
infringe.
2. Fair Use
The second manner in which the scope of copyright protection
is varied based on the type of work at issue involves the statutory
limitations on copyright owners' rights. All of the rights granted to
copyright owners are expressly subject to many statutory
limitations, 32 codified in sections 107 through 123 of the
Copyright Act.133 Some of these limitations apply only to certain
copyrighted work. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212
F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000). As argued in this Article, it is this latter inquiry into
substantial similarity that should be affected by motivational concerns.
127. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863
F.2d 1465, 1481 (9th Cir. 1988); Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d
527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).
128. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
129. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001).
130. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991); Fleener v. Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
131. See, e.g., Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g,
Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11 th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
132. Section 106 states that the rights granted to copyright owners are
"subject to sections 107-123 ... ." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
133. Id.
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categories of copyrighted works, while other limitations apply to
certain types of rights belonging to all copyright owners.
One of the most important limitations on the rights of all
copyright owners is found in the fair use doctrine. In the United
States, the fair use analysis is currently structured around the four
factors set out in section 107 of the Copyright Act. Courts have not
interpreted any of the four factors as requiring an inquiry into the
motivations that led to the creation or distribution of the allegedly
infringed work. While the Supreme Court has indicated that all
four factors must be considered and no presumptions should be
employed, 134 it has become clear in the case law that often the first
and fourth factors dominate the analysis, with the third and second
factors trailing in significance, in that order.' 35 Additionally, courts
tend to analyze the second and third factors in relation to the first
and fourth factors. 136 Generally, courts focus more on the
defendant's activities without much inquiry into the actions of the
plaintiff copyri ht owner or the class of creators for that particular
type of work.130
The first factor involves examining "the purpose and character
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes."' 38 As this factor focuses
solely on the defendant's use, this factor does not involve any
inquiry into the motivation for the creation of the plaintiffs work
or the type of work allegedly infringed. Instead, under the first
factor courts primarily focus on whether the defendant's use is
"transformative" and the extent of commercial motivation on the
defendant's part. Whether a use is transformative or, in the words
of one court, "substitutive,"'' 39 weighs significantly in the balance
of the fair use determination.
The other factor that heavily influences the fair use
determination is the fourth factor: "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."14° Courts
sometimes identify this factor as "the most important factor" or at
134. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
135. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure Approach to Fair
Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27-28
(1997).
136. Id.
137. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1525 (2004).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
139. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598.
140. § 107(4).
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least "primus inter pares,"'141 despite Supreme Court admonitions
against elevating one factor above others. 142 When the defendant's
use has a substitutive effect in the market, supplanting demand for
the plaintiffs original copyrighted work, courts rarely hold the
defendant's use to be a fair one. Even if the effect is on the
licensing market for the work, courts consider that to weigh against
a finding of fair use. 43 As explored more in Part V.D., the fourth
factor focuses on determining the market consequences of
permitting the defendant's use and, thus, could be tied expressly to
a consideration of the motivating forces for the creation and
distribution of the type of work at issue.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the third factor, "the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole," should be evaluated in relation to
the type of use that the defendant has engaged in (the first
factor). 144 Viewed through the lens of the first factor, the Supreme
Court has found copying of an entire work to be fair 145 and also
copying of only a small fraction of a work to be infringement. 146 It
is clear that the third factor involves both qualitative and
quantitative considerations.' 47 In the end, this factor focuses on the
use made by the defendant and is unrelated to the motivations of
the creator of the work.
The second factor, a relatively moribund factor, dictates
exploration of the "nature of the copyrighted work." Many courts
have erred in their interpretation of this factor, determining that the
second factor weighed in favor of the copyright owner because the
work was clearly copyrightable. 148 If the work was not
copyrightable, there would not be prima facie infringement and,
thus, there would be no need for an analysis of fair use. Courts that
have appropriately considered this second factor have essentially
141. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1385 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REv. 989, 1077 (1997) (noting the
tendency of the courts to focus primarily on market harm "to the exclusion of all
else").
142. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-85.
143. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d 1381; Am. Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
144. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
145. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
146. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
147. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
148. TY, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 2000 WL 1499449 (N.D.Ill), rev'd 292
F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229,
235 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofleinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 138
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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determined that what matters is where the plaintiffs work falls on
a continuum of copyrighted works. Works that are closer to the
"core" of copyright protection, such as highly creative works of
visual art, fictional literary works, and musical works, are given
more protection by courts because the second factor will be seen as
weighing against a finding of fair use. 149 Works more factual in
nature or more functional are given less protection by the second
factor weighing in favor of fair use. Other aspects of the "nature of
the copyrighted work" that courts have considered include whether
the work has been published150 and if the work is out of print.'51 As
explored more fully in Part V.C, this second factor invites inquiry
into the nature of the copyrighted work and should include
consideration of what motivates the creation and distribution of
that type of work.
C. Examples of Statutorily Based Tailoring
The Copyright Act currently contains some tailoring of the
rights granted to copyright owners based on different categories of
works. For example, section 1 10 limits the rights of a copyright
owner for nondramatic musical works,152 permitting certain public
performances that would otherwise be within the scope of the
copyright owner's rights. Nondramatic musical works also are
subjected to a compulsory license that permits anyone to record
their own sound recording of such a work once an authorized
version has been released.' Additionally, sound recordings are
not granted a general public performance right but instead are
given a more limited "right to perform the work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission." 154 The rights of a sound recording
copyright owner are further limited by requiring an actual
reproduction of the sounds, taking "sound alikes" outside the
reproduction and derivative work rights generally granted to
copyright owners. 155 Further limits are placed on the rights of
149. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
150. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
151. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409
(2002) (urging courts to consider duration issues in this factor as well).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 110(6)-(8) (2000).
153. § 115.
154. § 106(6).
155. § 114.
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copyright owners of works classified as useful articles, 156 computer
programs,157 and architectural works.1
58
These examples of specific statutory tailoring demonstrate that
adjusting the levels of protections for different types of works is
possible even within the statute. Presently, however, the statute
does not contain any specific tailoring based on the motivating
considerations as urged by this Article.
V. CONSIDERING MOTIVATION WITHIN THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT
FRAMEWORK
As developed in Parts I and II, it is appropriate to consider the
motivational drive for the creation and distribution of copyrighted
works when establishing the level of copyright protection to afford
any particular work. Part IV demonstrated that current copyright
doctrine does not expressly consider motivation in this way and
identified three places in copyright doctrine where such
consideration would be possible: the substantial similarity analysis
and the second and fourth factors of the fair use inquiry. This
section provides more detail on how such considerations could be
implemented by courts.
A. Identifying Types of Works to be Afforded Less Robust
Protection
Before addressing the means by which judicial interpretation of
the Copyright Act could reduce the strength of protection for
certain types of works, it is important to establish how a court
would determine whether a particular copyrighted work falls into
the category of a work that should be afforded thinner protection.
Courts already recognize reduced protection for factual works by
engaging in line drawing about the type of work at issue; thus the
task to be undertaken is not unfamiliar to judges. The key will be
to define what constitutes a non-monetarily motivated creation.
When considering motivations, it is important that courts look
not at the motivation of a particular author of a particular work, but
rather at the typical motivations that lead to the creation and
distribution of the type of work at issue. Three reasons counsel
against using a subjective inquiry. First, the subjective inquiry is
not likely to lead to the desired result, as many examples of highly
156. § 113. "Useful article" is a term of art in the Copyright Act, defined in
Section 101.
157. § 117.
158. § IZO.
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creative works find their origin in non-monetary motivations.
Using subjective motivation of a particular author could therefore
result in abuse within the industry as publishers seek to take
advantage of highly talented individuals and dedicated artists who
love their craft and will often attest that they are "not in it for the
money." Second, if the subjective motivations of the individual
plaintiff were at issue, the temptation would be great for plaintiffs
to simply aver to monetary considerations being significant in their
motivations. 159
Finally, a more objective inquiry into the motivations for a
particular category of work would allow potential users of the
work, ex ante, some ability to judge how robust the copyright
protection for a type of work is likely to be. If a subjective inquiry
into motivation were necessary, most users would not be able to
judge whether a particular creator's motivation will affect the
scope of protection for a particular work.
Courts should therefore ask, and litigators should be prepared
to answer: is the copyrighted work of a type that would be created
and sufficiently distributed in the absence of strong copyright
protection? This is not an inquiry into whether the work would be
created and distributed if no copyright protection were available;
rather it is an inquiry into whether weak copyright protection is
sufficient protection. In considering the categories of works
identified above,1 60 each would meet that test. The creators of
those types of works engage in creation either for non-monetary
reasons or for monetary reasons that are not related to the
marketable rights provided by copyright protection. Additionally,
each of those types of works would have been distributed even
with weaker protection. As discussed above, it is important that
courts consider not only the motivation for creation but the effect
that weaker copyright protection may have on the economic
dynamics of distribution.
The objective inquiry may result in some creative individuals
choosing to no longer create new works. These are the individuals
for whom a subjective inquiry would have dictated strong
protection: they need the heightened incentive in order to invest
time and energy in the creation and distribution of their work.
159. One way to guard against post-hoc explanations would be to examine
the timing of the registration of the copyright in the particular work. While
copyright registration is not required to obtain protection, there are significant
evidentiary and monetary benefits to be gained by prompt registration. See §§
411, 412. If a creator is motivated by monetary concerns it is therefore likely
that such a creator will register his work promptly. Delay in registration could be
a proxy used as circumstantial evidence of true motivation.
160. See supra Part I.
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However, by using an objective inquiry we are, by definition,
selecting types of works where the majority of creators of those
works will continue creating even with weaker copyright
protection.
As courts developed this inquiry, categories would emerge and
industries would adapt to the revised levels of protection. If
employed properly, the end result would be a reduction in the
social cost of providing the copyright incentive for the creation and
dissemination of creative works.
B. Degree of Similarity Affected by Motivation for Creation
While courts have not explicitly embraced an inquiry into the
motivation for the creation of a particular type of work as relevant
to determining the scope of copyright protection, it is both
appropriate and possible to do so under current copyright doctrine.
First, in determining the magnitude of similarity necessary to meet
the similarity requirement in an infringement analysis, the type of
work being infringed is typically considered. In doing so, courts
often consider the level of creativity evidenced in the plaintiffs
work. For example, to infringe compilations of factual elements,
courts have required near identity in the defendant's work. 
161
Similarity in this context is used to determine improper
appropriation. If the defendant's work is not sufficiently similar to
the plaintiff's, no improper appropriation has occurred, and there is
no infringement of plaintiffs copyright. The degree of similarity
required is decided on the facts of the case, often using both
quantitative and qualitative measures. Courts should expand their
inquiry and consider the primary motivation for the creation and
distribution of the type of work at issue as relevant to the degree of
similarity required in order to infringe a particular work. Using a
formulation proposed by Nimmer, courts have identified two
different types of similarity: "fragmented literal similarity" and
"non-fragmented comprehensive similarity."' 162 In both of these
types of infringement inquiries, consideration of the motivations of
161. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991);
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir.
1988); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Sid &
Marty Kroffl Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir.
1977); Penelope v. Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Mass. 1992).
162. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986); MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (2005). But
see MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 412-14 n.27
(2005) (proposing a different terminology: "verbatim similarity" and "pattern
similarity").
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creators of the type of work at issue would be appropriate. When
creators and distributors of a particular type of work are not
primarily motivated by the marketable right granted by copyright,
greater similarity should be required in order to find infringement.
Consider as an example, a case that is used in many copyright
and intellectual property casebooks: Steinberg v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc.163 In that case, the plaintiff, Saul
Steinberg, sued for infringement of a work that had been
commissioned for use on the cover of The New Yorker magazine.
The work, often referred to as a New Yorker's view of the world,
could be classified as advertising copy. 164 The motivation for the
creation of the image was the commission payment by The New
Yorker. Even with weaker copyright protection, magazines like
The New Yorker would still have sufficient incentive to purchase
attractive cover artwork and to use that artwork by publicly
distributing its magazines. Their business is selling magazines, and
more attractive covers presumably help achieve that goal. The
defendants in that case had created a poster, a portion of which
emulated Steinberg's work and the remainder of which consisted
of images of the actors in a movie that the poster was designed to
advertise.165 The court determined that the image in the poster was
sufficiently similar to the plaintiffs work, despite significant
differences and major portions of the poster that contained other
images. While a portion of defendants' work clearly copies
Stienberg's work, if the court had taken into consideration the
motivational influences as outlined in this Article, it would have
been more appropriate to find no infringement. The defendant's
work was not overwhelmingly similar to the copyrighted image. At
163. 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). For example, this case is used in
COHEN, supra note 5, at 336; ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBERG,
COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 572 (7th ed. 2006); ROBERT P. MERGES,
PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 474 (4th ed. 2006).
164. Some may take issue with this classification arguing that magazine
covers are often produced by artists and are highly creative. Even though highly
creative, the bulk of the compensation expected by artists for these covers comes
from the commissioning entity-the magazine-to whom all copyright rights
are assigned. The artist does not profit from the copyright except to the extent
that copyright affects the willingness of the magazine publisher to pay for the
commission and the amount it is willing to pay. Further, it is unlikely that the
commissioning entity factors the various potential licensing opportunities for
derivative works of its covers into the price it is willing to pay for the
commission.
165. See also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.
1998) (additional example of a magazine cover being used as a basis for a movie
poster advertisement).
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the same time, weaker copyright protection for this type of work
would not reduce significantly the amount of these types of works
created and distributed.
C. Incorporating Creative Motivation into Fair Use: The Second
Factor
Fair use is designed to allow for ex post ordering of copyright
rights by courts. It would be entirely consistent with the fair use
analysis for courts to consider motivation for the creation and
dissemination of the type of work at issue when analyzing the
second fair use factor. While the wording of section 107 allows
courts to consider factors outside of the four listed in that
section. 16 6 the second factor, the "nature of the copyrighted
work," 6 7 invites consideration of the motivations behind creation
and distribution of a particular type of work.
168
The analysis of the second factor has been relatively
inconsequential in most court opinions. The nature of the
copyrighted work might be significant if the work was
unpublished169 or if the court finds that the work lies far from the
"core of copyright protection," such as a heavily factual work or a
compilation of factual or public domain information. 17 Allowing
courts to explicitly consider the motivational dimensions of a type
of work would permit courts to tailor the costs of protection to the
level of robustness necessary to motivate creation and distribution
166. Section 107 states: "In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include .... ." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The use of the word "include" to introduce the four factors
draws upon the definitions provided in the Copyright Act which provides that
"[t]he terms 'including' and 'such as' are illustrative and not limitative." § 101.
167. § 107(2).
168. Reconciling such an approach with international treaty obligations is
also possible using a robust interpretation of "fair remuneration" in the
permitted exceptions test of both the Berne Convention and the TRIPs
Agreement. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (2000).
169. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic, 294 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005).
170. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th
Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 293 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir.
2001); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Sys. Int'l, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (Cal.
2003). Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(concluding the work at issue lies in the core of copyright protection, but that
such conclusion is not helpful in a case involving parody).
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of a particular type of work.17 1 The other three factors should also
be considered so as to prevent the second fair use factor from
becoming a proxy for denying copyright protection altogether.
Using this proposed consideration in the fair use analysis
would mean that if a newspaper quoted substantial portions of a
recent papal decree, the second fair use factor would weigh in
favor of a finding of fair use. A court would inquire into the nature
of papal decrees and other documents from churches designed to
provide guidance to church members. The creation and
dissemination of such documents, a court would likely conclude,
are motivated not by the market-based incentives that copyright
law creates, but by other considerations. That conclusion should
influence the result in a fair use analysis, weighing in favor of fair
use and thus creating a less robust scope of protection for that type
of work.
D. Incorporating Creative Motivation into Fair Use: The Fourth
Factor
The fourth factor in the fair use analysis focuses on the market
effect that permitting the defendant's use will have. In particular,
courts consider not just the use by the particular defendant in the
case, but the effect if the use should become widespread. 172 From
the first articulation of the fair use doctrine, courts have been
concerned with the effect on the output of creative works and their
distribution. Justice Story, in Folsom v. Marsh, directed courts to
examine "the nature and objects of the selections made, the
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work."'173 Focusing on the diminishment
of plaintiffs profits is the point of the fourth factor.
The fourth factor, however, should be put in context and
related not only to the nature and purpose of the use, as the
Supreme Court has directed, but also to the nature of the
copyrighted work at issue. If the work is one whose creation and
distribution is not motivated primarily by monetary concerns, then
more of an effect on profits would be permissible without harming
the underlying goal of copyright. Allowing the express
171. Professor Ramsey has previously suggested consideration of the fact
that the work is advertising copy as weighing in favor of fair use under the
second factor. Ramsey supra note 4, at 248-249. See also Carroll, supra note 48
(suggesting such tailoring to ameliorate the cost of uniform copyright
protection).
172. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
173. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
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consideration of motivational realities to affect the evaluation of
the effect any market harm might have could be a means to
appropriately tailor the rights of copyright owners in differently
motivated works.
VI. POSSIBLE STATUTORY AMENDMENTS TO REDUCE PROTECTION
Statutory amendments to reduce the level of protection
afforded the types of works identified in this Article could take the
form of specific limitations on the rights granted to copyright
owners. Section 107 is but one statutory section out of 17 separate
sections that place limits on the rights of copyright owners. As
discussed above, 174 some of those other statutory limits are
targeted at specific types of works, such as nondramatic musical
works, 175  sound recordings, 176  useful articles, 177  computer
programs, 178 and architectural works. 179 Consistent with the
arguments put forth in this Article, certain types of works not
requiring robust protection could be identified and defined in the
statute and an appropriate statutory limitation enacted.
One possible significant limitation would be to eliminate or
reduce the right to control derivative works. A limitation focused
on reducing the most significant societal cost of copyright
protection, the increased cost of producing and distributing new
works with added creativity, 180 would do the most for furthering
the underlying goals of copyright protection. The Copyright Act
contains precedent for such a limitation. When Congress added
protection for sound recordings to the Copyright Act in 197 1,181 it
included a limitation that prevented "sound-alike" works from
constituting infringement of the sound recording copyright. 182
Similarly, Congress could enact a limitation on the derivative work
right for differently motivated works and thereby reduce the wealth
distribution effects and reduce the cost of "inputs" for future
creative works.
174. See supra Part IV.C.
175. 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(6)-(8), 115-16 (2000).
176. § 114.
177. § 113. "Useful article" is a term of art in the Copyright Act, defined in
Section 101.
178. § 117.
179. § 120.
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971, effective Feb. 15, 1972).
182. § 114(b). This limitation was significantly influenced by the dynamics
of the music industry and the powerful lobby forces behind the different
positions at stake. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music
Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 673 (2003).
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The likelihood of statutory change of the magnitude suggested
here, however, is extremely low. The problems of industry capture
of the legislative process in the field of copyright law are discussed
at length in other articles.1 83 As described by one scholar,
copyright lawmaking has been a one-way ratchet:184 greater and
greater protections have been afforded to copyright owners with
little limitation placed on those new protections, let alone
limitations on already existing protection. For purposes of this
Article, the current state of copyright law-making is taken as a
given. Recognizing the slim reality of legislative change, there are,
nonetheless, provisions in the current statute that courts can and
should interpret to achieve some more modest reductions in the
strength of protection for works where incurring the cost of robust
protection is unnecessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current U.S. copyright law provides relatively uniform
protection for copyrighted works. This uniformity of protection
imposes costs on society when such costs are not necessary to
motivate creation and dissemination of certain types of works. The
law should take into account the primary creative motivation for
types of creative works in determining the scope of protection to
afford. The scope of protection can be varied through
determinations of how similar an alleged infringing work needs to
be to violate the copyright owner's rights and through
consideration of the second fair use factor. If a court determines
that reducing the scope of protection would not significantly
undermine the motivations for creation and dissemination of the
type of work at issue, that finding should weigh heavily in the
degree of similarity required for non-literal infringement and in
analyzing whether defendant's use is a fair use.
By reducing the robustness of copyright protection for these
differently motivated works, the costs to society would be
decreased, which, in the end, would better help facilitate the
underlying goal of copyright law: The promotion of knowledge
and learning.
183. Copyright, Compromise, supra note 11, at 879.
184. DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, at 80.
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